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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

RELIABLE FURNITURE aJMPANY

I

'

Plaintiff and Appellant,

I
I

vs.

I

AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE CO.,

Case No.

I

WESTERN GEl\'ERAL AGENCY, and

11656

I

GENERAL A DJllSTMENT BUREAU,

Defendants and Respondents.

I
I

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
PETITION FOR REHEARING
RELIEF

SOUGHT BY

FOR REHEARING

Appellant seeks reversal of the decision
and findings of the

Court of Utah in

the instant action by reason of the Judgment
<)ranted by the Court on

10, 1970,

whC'rein it affirmed the Judgment of the lower
C<>u rt.

Appell ant seeks to have the Supreme

_)urt remand the case bar:k to the lower Court,
5

so that Appellant may have a jury weigh the
facts and determine the issues set forth by
the oleading of the Appellant and Respondents
and do justice to the parties.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Anpellant refers the Honorable Court to
both the Appellant's original Brief and
Appellant's reply Brief in the matter herein
as to the facts in this action, but would draw
to the attention of the Court an error in the
written decision of the Court, wherein in the
third oaragraph of the Court's March 10, 1970,
statement of the case, it alleges that a fire
occurred on March 30, 1961, ''*
weeks later on June 16, 1961."

* * and six
It is pointed

out to this Honorable Court that March 30,
1961, to June 16, 1961, is a period of approximately 79 days.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1.
THE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER
6

OOURT JU£X1.1ENT RULING THERE WAS AN ACCORD AND

SATISFACTION.

Accord and Satisfaction is an affirmative
defense, but must be pleaded, as set forth
in the reply Brief of the Appellant on Page 2.
The Court in its March 10, 1970, decision in
the instant action, referred to Bennet vs.
Robinson's Medical Mart, Inc., Supreme Court
of the State of Utah, 18 Ut.2d 186, 417 P.2d 761,
August, 1966, as authority for its statement,
"Where a person (the Plaintiff) has in writing
accepted a settlement of a disputed claim, the
effect is an llccord and

This

is a case wherein the employee was the Plaintiff
and sought recovery of commissions from the
Defendant who was the employer.

The Defendant-

employer gave the Plaintiff-employee a check
with a notation, payment in full thereon, and
the Plaintiff cashed the check taking the proceeds and subsequently filed an action for
additional monies coming to him and the Defendant sought to defend on the grounds of an Accord
7

and Satisfaction.

In this case, the employee

cashing the check with a notation that payment
was in full was held by the Court as not constituting an Accord and Satisfaction as held
by the Utah Supreme Court.

This case is direct

authority for the Reliable facts that there
was no accord.
This Honorable Court held in the Scoville
vs. Kellogg Sales Company case, 261 P.2d 933,
October 16, 1953, which was a case wherein a
salesman had funds coming and was paid by a
check, which he endorsed and cashed without
formal protest and subsequently filed an action
against the employer for additional monies
allegedly due and owing.

Ille defense of the

emoloyer was an Accord and Satisfaction and the
Utah Supreme Court stated that this defense was
one for a jury to decide.

See also Ralph A.

Badger & Company vs. Fidelity Building & Loan
Association, 94 Ut. 97, 75 P.2d 669; A. W. Sewell
Company vs. Commercial casualty & Insurance
8

Company, 80 Ut. 378, 15 P.2d 327.
Louis W. Trompeter vs. United Insurance
Company, Supreme Court of Washington, October
17, 1957, 316 P.2d 455, held, that in a personal
injury case where a sum was paid by an Insurer
for loss of time and med:i cal expense due under
the terms of the policy and was a liquidated
sum, that there was no consideration for the
release of the Insurer's liability to the Insured.

That under the facts, existing therein,

there had not been payment for all of his injury
and that, therefore, the consideration was insufficient and there could not be an Accord
and Satisfaction or Release in the matter.
This Honorable Court held in Kelley vs.
Salt Lake Transportation Company, August 15,
1941, 116 P.2d 383, that where consideration is
grossly inadequate as to a Release, that the
very inadequacy of the amount may clearly indicate fraud therein.
This Court in its last instant decision,
stated, quoting from Jiminez vs. O'Brien,
9

117 Ut. 82, 213 P.2d 337, "The avoidance (of
an Accordance and

requires clear

and convincing evidence."

However,

this Court

in a later statement, in Kirchgestner vs.
Denver & Rio Grande

Railroad Company,

233 P.2d 699, June 19, 1951, in defining "clear
and convincing" stated that "we had occasion
recently to examine the expression 'clear and
convincing evidence' and the Court defined it
as evidence that must at least have reached a
where there remains no serious doubt or
substantial doubt as to the correctness of the
conclusion."

Assuming that the Court should

ignore all of the other conditions which have
been set forth as necessary, to have a pleading
of Accord and Satisfaction in the action herein,
and assuming that all of the other elements
hPreinabove set forth have been met, it must
be obvious from the three day testimony of
Plaintiff's witnesses,
viewed

'

that the evidence being

as this Court has said, "in the light
10

most favorable to the Plaintiff's contentions"
that an Accord and Satisfactjon cannot lie

'

and that there is sufficient evidence in the
testimor.y in the record, in avoidance of such
an Accord and Satisfaction.
This Court stated in Reliable F\Jrni ture
Company vs. Fidelity at 16 Ut. 2d 211, 398
P.2d 685, February 3, 1965, "uoon the basis of
the record thus far, it appears that Defendants
own figures showed that it owes the Plaintiff
$12,609.39."

As evidenced by the record in

the instant case before this Court, this figure
shows that the amount owing to the Plaintiff
is in a sum of approximately $128,000.00.
Casper National Bank vs. Woodin, et al.,
Supreme Court of Wyoming, June 19, 1951, 232
P.2d 706, the Court stated, that where a debtor
already does what it is already bound to do,
that there is no

to support an

Accord and Satisfaction.
1'tah

As this Court, the

Court, has said the $12,000.00
11

9iven to the Appellant, was a minimal consideration and in light of the testimony now on
record and before this Court, was not even an
aporoxi ma ti on of the amount truly due.
It was stated in Siegal vs. A. L. Lechler,
Supreme Court of Colorado, November 1, 1954,
275 P.2d 949, that a release given for a nominal

consideration is not supported by any valid
legal consideration and that it is void and
does not bar a right of action by the Plaintiff
for the full amount actually owing to the party.
Moore vs. Satir, Supreme Court of California 1
July 11 z 19491 207 P.2d 835, the Court set forth
what the elements of an Accord are:

1.

A proper subject matter.

2.

Competent ;Jarties.

3,

Consent or meeting of the minds of the

na r ti es.

4.

Consideration.

As has been areviously set forth for this
r,1urt,

there is an entire lack of two of the
12

elements herein; which would be the consent
or meeting of the minds of the oarties, and
the consideration herein; and further,

the

California Court held that whether or not there
was an

was a question of fact,

the

intention of the parties, and hence, a jury
question and not one for the lower Court to
have taken away from the jury in giving its
decision.
POirff I I.

THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING FRAUD AS A
MATTER OF U\W.

The Court in its decision of March 10,
1970, precipitously dismissed fraud as a factor,

stating some of the elements of fraud were
missing herein.

It is the contention of the

Anpellant that deceit is a basic element of
fraud and can constitute fraud.
1n

M.

As set forth

G. Chamberlain and Comnany vs. Kenneth R.
District Court of Appeal of California,

j\-'2_9ust 25,

1959, at 343 P.2d 438,
1.1

''deceit is

either the suggestion as a fact, of that which
is not true, by one who does not believe it
to be true, or the suppression of a fact by
one who is bound to disclose it, or who gives
information of other facts, which are likely
to mislead for want of communication of that
fact."

The evidence

this Court is clear

that William Ball as agent of the General Adjustment Bureau and Jack Day as agent for the other
in this action, had a duty to disclose
to the Plaintiff, that the $84,000.00 check for
the inventory was deliverable to the Plaintiff
without any strings whatsoever attached to it,
and that his failure to so act and his insistence as the unimpeached testimony of the
Plaintiff's witnesses, Sam Herscovitz and Wayne
clearly evidences, that not only was
there no revelation of an unincumbered delivery
of the check for the inventory, but to the contrary,

that conditions were attached to its

delivery, namelv, the accertance of the $12,000.00
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draft as settlement for American Home Assurance.
The California Court in the Chamberlain case
went further and stated "Where a release is
orocured through fraud and conspiracy, it is
immaterial whether the fraud was practiced by
an authorized or a self-constituted agent of
the Releasee.

In either event, the Releasee

should not be allowed to take advantage of an
unfair settlement obtained through the fraud
of a third party, for his benefit.

Even persons

who are not parties to procuring of a release
cannot defend its validity against arocurement
by fraud."

D:>binson vs. McD:>nald, 92 California 33,
27 P. 1098; Chung vs. Johnston, 128 California

App. 2d 157, 274 P.2d 922, set forth the principle,

that the failure to disclose material

facts affecting the essence of a release agreement may constitute actual fraud vitiating the
contract.
Winstanley vs. Ackerman, 110 Cal.
15

App. 641,

294 P. 449, stated that where it is shown that
deception has been practiced in obtaining a
release, it may not be considered as a satisfaction of anything not consented to by the
Claimant.
Jordan vs. Guerra, 23 Cal. 2d. 469, 144
P.2d 349, sets forth the principle that in any
case, where fraud or release is alleged, it
is for the Trier of Facts to determine whether
one of the oarties had an understanding of the
effect of the writing, which was different from
that expressed in the writing, and whether his
different understanding was induced by the
other party.
This Court in its Reliable decision of
February 1965 stated that "upon consideration
of the record as it has come to us, we cannot
conclude with such certainty as to justify
ruling as a matter of law, that there was no
duress and/or fraud practiced upon the Plaintiff
tn obtaining the release in question."

16

It should be stated that the unimoeached
testimony set forth in the record here, and
stating the testimony of Wayne Dykstra and
Sam Herscovitz, clearly being considered in
the light most favorable to the Plaintiff and
being unimpeached, is even a stronger record

than was evidenced by the Depositions and
Pleadings before the Court at the time it made
this state:nent.
It was stated in Francis McKinley Samora
vs. Lorenzo Bradford, January 2, 1970, the
Court of Appeals of New Mexico, 465 P.2d 88,
"uncontradicted evidence, which is not subject
to reasonable doubts, may not be arbitrarily
disregarded."

This was also adopted in the

cases of Aragon vs. Boyd, 80 N.M. 14, 450 P.2d
614, 1969; Medler vs. Henry, 44 N.M. 275, 101

P.2d 398, 1940.

Testimony need not be accepted

as true when not directly contradicted,

1.

if:

The witnesses are shown to be unworthy

of belief, or

17

2.

His testimony is equivocal or contains

inherent improbabilities, or
3.

Shows a transaction surrounded by sus-

picious circumstances, or
4.

Is contradicted, subject to reasonable

doubt as to truth and veracity, by legitimate
inferences drawn from the facts and circumstances
of the case.
This principle being set forth in Hales vs.
VanCleave, 78 N.M. 181, 429 P.2d 379, stated,
credibility is a matter for the Jury and not
f0r the Court in a Summary Judgment or Dismissal.

POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE [X)CTRINE OF
DECISIS.

STARE

The doctrine of stare decisis js described
in Floyd vs.

Department of Labor and Industries,

Supreme Court of Washington, April 9, 1954,
69 P. 2d 563,

"The rule laid down in any parti-

cular case is applicable only to the facts in
that particular case or to another case involvin·_i

identical or substantially similar facts."

As

defined in Black's Law Dictionary, fourth

f'dition,

Page 157,

stare decisis is binding

on the Court only "in subsequent cases where
the very 3oint is again in controversy" and
where the "facts are substantially the same."
Chester Barnett vs. M. T. Brown and C. V.
Hoke, Supreme Court of New Mexico, October 18,
1956,

302 P.2d 735,

the Court stated "the

are orecisely as those raised and passed
upon in our decision filed August 15, 1950* * *
which decision controls disposition of this
appeal.''

The Court here setting forth the rule

that where an issue on appeal is the same as
:Heviously and has been passed upon by a decision of the Supreme Court that such decision
the dis?osition of the
In the Reliable case of February, 1965, the
facts before the Court were the pleadings,
[R;>osi tions, and Interrogatories of the parties
;.ind in the instant :_Hevious Reliable case,
is no controverting of any of the basic

19

facts therein, nor was there any impeachment
of the facts then set forth before the Court.
The doctrine of stare decisis would seem to
apply and be effective in the action before the
Court.

Stocks vs. Stocks, Supreme Court of

Nevada, July 24, 1947, 183 P.2d 617, the Court
stated "while Courts will indeed depart from
the doctrine of stare decisis, where such deis necessary to avoid the 'perpetuation
of error',

the observance of the doctrine has

long been considered indispensable to the due
of justice, that a question
once deliberately examined and decided should
be considered as settled."
POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING ECONOMIC OORESS
AS A MATTER 0 F LAW.

This Honorable Court stated in its
1965 Reliable dee) sion "In determining whether

the Plaintiff is entitled to redress, it is
not essential that his contentions of fraud and
duress be considered seoarately.
20

They can and

should be considered on the basis that he contends,

that they existed intermingled together;

and based upon the proper

the

Court correctly assumed that the Plaintiff was
in economic distress and that the Defendant
knew and took advantage of this by falsely representing that money belonging to the Plaintiff
could not be delivered to him, wrongfully
refusing to deliver it unless the Plaintiff
would also accept the proffered settlement
on Defendant's policy resulting in the Plaintiff
being compelled to accept a settlement 'against
his will."

The Court made these observations

in 1965 having before it only the nleadings,
Depositions, and Briefs of the parties.

In the

March 10, 1970, Reliable decision, the unimand sworn to testimony of the Appellants
witnesses was before the Court, fully setting
forth every element ?ertaining to duress and
fraud as appeared in the earlier decision, and
in

addition, a detailed statement of the fraud
21

and duress as testified to by the witnesses
under oath.
This Honorable Court claimed all of these
factors of fraud and duress were overcome by
the fact that Sam Herscovitz was a Law School
graduate and an intelligent man, with business
as against the fact that the Defendants' agents were Insurance Agents and Adjustors
and schooled and trained in the experience of
giving the least and getting the most, and most
important, had in their possession property of
the Plaintiff in the amount of over $84,000.00
which was desperately needed by the Plaintiff
if it was to survive.

The Defendants had all

the advantages in the game that was played on
the premises of the Reliable Furniture on June 19,
1961.

Mr. Herscovitz never denied that he knew

he was being cheated and being taken advantage
of by the Defendants, and the fact

that he was

a Law School graduate and that he was intelli'lPnt, and that he had business exrerience, might
22

have been the basis for his having knowledge
of the principles of the Law, and perhaps
having the naivette of a student of the Law,
in believing that principles of the Law are
easily, accurately, and always applied to specifie situations, such as the rule laid down by

this Honorable Court in the Reliable case of
February 1965 when it held "that where a release
has been obtained by fraud, the return or tender
of consideration is not a necessary condition
rrecedent to disaffirmance of release and enforcement of one's claim."
Metropolitan State Bank,

Inc., vs.

Crox, et al., Supreme Court of Colorado,
October 8, 1956, 302 P.2d 188, is authority for
the statement " • • • or one induced by fraud,
imnosition, over-reaching, or misrepresentation,
nr by concealment of the material facts, such
that if it had been known to the other party,
he would not have entered into the Accord is

'J'lidahle and ineffective, and as elsewhere ao?ears,
1nay

he set as1·de a t the i·nstance of the injured
23

riarty."

The Court further stated that an agree-

ment and its performance cannot constitute
an Accord and Satisfaction of a claim or demand,
where it is the result of collusion or what is
known as "business compulsion."
Wheelock Bros.,

Inc.

1

vs. Bankers Warehouse

Company, et al., Supreme Court of Colorado,
July 1, 1946, 171 ?. 2d 405, is a case analogous
to the Reliable situation in that the Defendant,
Bailee, had in his possession merchandise which
was the property of the Plaintiff, Bailor.
The Bailee, by reason of its negligent conduct,
delivered up some of the property of the Bailor
to a third person and upon the Bailor demanding
back the remaining inventory in order to prevent any further liquidation of the inventory
the Bailee refused to release the
inventory without a full release of any claim
that the Plaintiff might have, in order to get
the remaining goods, and upon being given the
rp l

did deliver
ease b y t h e Plal·r,t1"ff--Bailor,
"

24

u::i

the remaining inventory.

The action herein

was to invalidate the release and to recover
the Oefendant,

the value of the merchandise

which it had in its possession and had delivered
U'J

without turning over a de qua te compensation

to the Bailor for same.

The Court quoted Moise

Bros. Company vs. Jamison, 89 Colorado 278,
1 P.2d 925, for authority that "such release
was without consideration and given under duress
of goods."

The Court further stated that the

Defendant could not allege the release as a

bar to recovery by the Plaintiff.

This Honor-

ab le Court in its February 196 5 decision on

behalf of Reliable cited Manno vs. Mutual Ben.,
Health and Accident Association, 187 NYS 2d.
709,

also Kelley vs. United Mutual

Insurance

112 S.W. 2d 929, as authority for
the statement made by this HonoralJle Court when
it stated "if found to be true,

this false re-

-)resentation, coupled with the wrongful with-

'•11 1 dj ng o f

that whi'ch tJelonged to the Plaintiff,
25

may well justify a finding of duress which
would afford him release from the settlement."
The Ct)urt stated in the Reliable March 10,

.!.22.Q., decision that the signing of the
$12,000.00 draft nine days later was done after
all coercion had terminated by reason of the
cashing of the $84,923.39 draft.

The closure

of Reliables business for 47 days, the non payment for its inventory of $84,923.39 until more
than 80 days had elapsed, the inability to
repair the premises and obtain replacement of
inventory for six months all were coercive factors.
The Court is overlooking the most important fact
of all -

the payment of $12,609.00 rather than

$128,000.00 business interruption loss rightfully owing the Plaintiff to cover the actual
exoenditure it made for continuing costs of
overhead must be considered in its proper relation
to fraud and economic duress.

This was a

continuing economic factor that was not cured
tiy

the payment of the insurance proceeds.
26

POINT V.
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING RIGfT OF TRIAL

BY JURY.

The Appellant brought to the attention of
this Honorable Court in its last instant
Reliable Brief, that this Court has recognized
in Fimlayson vs. Brady, 121 Ut. 204, 240 P.2d

49J:,

that the right to trial by jury is an

ancient and valued right, not to be denied
without compelling reasons.
In Raymond vs. Union Pacific Railroad, 1948,
the Supreme Court of Utah, 191 P.2d 137, referring to the constitutional right of trial by
jury stated that "this Court is charged with a
duty of protecting all of the rights of all
litigants.

This is especially true of those

fundamental rights guaranteed by the State and
Federal Constitutions."

The Court further stated

in this case "that the right to have a jury
pass upon the issues of fact does not include
the right to have a cause submitted to a jury

27

in the hope of a verdict, when the facts
undisputably show that the Plaintiff is not
ent:i tled to release."

In the instant case before

this Honorable Court, we are seeking to determine whether there was duress, fraud, release
and/or ratification.

The determination of any

one of these is a factual issue, and factual
issues are for the Jury to determine.

This was

affirmed in the Fimlayson case supra and is
set forth in 78-21-2 Utah Code Annotated as
amended 1953; all questions of fact, where a
trial is by jury, other then those mentioned
in the next section, are to be decided by the
jury, and all evidence thereon is to be addressed
to them, except when otherwise provided.
Article 1, Section XI, of the Utah Constitution, was cited by this Court in the February
1965 Reliable decision and was alleged in
Appellant's Brief on Page 13 and 14 of the
instant action before this Court.

The Supreme

Cnurt of the State of Utah is circumscribed in
28

its power and jurisdiction by the Constitution
and by the

of the State of Utah, and

it was held in the case of State of Oregon vs.
Frank B.

Reid, June 20, 1956, &ipreme Court

of Oregon, 298 P.2d 990, "No Court is authorized
to construe Law to fit each individual case as
it arises.

If it attempted such, the orderly

administration of justice, according to the
well established rules adopted to protect the
public, would cease and chaos would reign."
53 Am. Jur., Page 292, Section 362, states
"the trial Court should not assume to direct a
verdict where its ruling would require it to
nass upon the credibility of witnesses and weigh
testimony, or would require it to resolve a
conflict in the evidence; whenever there is
credible evidence from which a reasonable conclusion can be drawn in support of the claim of
the narty against whom the Motion is made, the
must be denied and the case submitted
tn

the jury."

It is submitted to this Court

29

that three days testimony by the Plaintiff's
advocates, can only be determined against the
Plaintiff, by the Court presumptiously taking
from the jury, the right to determine by
credibility and demeanor,
0f the testimony given.

the value and weight
This particularly so

when there has been no valid impeachment,
either from direct or cross examination, of the
Plaintiff's witnesses, or by direct testimony
of Defendants' witnesses.
Article 1, Section VII, of the Constitution
for the State of Utah provides:

"No person

5hall be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law."

It is submitted

to this Honorable Court, that what this Court
stated in its Reliable 1965 decision was in
at that time and is even more in point,
now that more then nine years have elapsed from
the time of the injury of the Plaintiff and
his pursuit of his constitutional remedies
when this Court stated "Even more fundamental
30

,.
on this ooint is the reflection upon the
fact the

object is always to do

justice between the parties."
CONCUJSION
WE SUBMIT TO THIS HONORABLE COURT TiiAT
THERE

IS NO EVIDENCE SO QEAR, THAT AS A MATTER

OF LAW,

IT CAN BE HELD TiiAT TiiERE WAS NO DURESS

AND/OR FRAUD PRACTICED UPON THE PLAINTIFF, AND
THAT THE DEFEND\NT CANNOf WITH HINDSIGfT REMEDY

lllE CASE BY INJECTING AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES,
WHICH IT DID NOT PLEAD IN THIS ACTION ORIGINALLY.

IT IS ASKED THAT THIS CASE BE REMANDED FOR

TRIAL BY A JURY AS PRAYED FOR BY PLAINTIFF.

Resoectfully submitted,
PETE N.

VLAHOS

Eccl es Building
Ogden, Utah
RICHARD W. CAMPBELL of

Olmstead, Stine and
2324 Adams Avenue
Ogden, Utah

Attorneys for Appellant
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